On Defining ‘War.’

During my time at McMaster university, one of the courses that stuck out to me the most was called ‘The Causes of War,’ for which I had written this essay. The course was encaptivating for multiple reasons; among them, the professor had been teaching the class upwards of 25 years, and claimed he disliked discussing the definitions of war (in relation to the rest of the course) for his fear was that political scientists would become preoccupied with mundane terminology over sincere analysis. And yet, the passion with which he spoke of the so-called boring definitions caused most of us students to stay until the very end of those three-hour classes on chilly Monday nights. Below, I attempt to properly define and relate what war is from an undertaking of intricately various perspectives, and accordingly, I have added my own analysis of which conception I believe to be the most encompassing of them all. The worthwhile read suggests that defining war is much more perplexing than the likes of that which Merriam-Webster could easily accomplish, implicating serious moral ethics within its five perspectives.

The first way in which war is defined is the blanket definition upon which all others expand from, the Legalistic Conception of War (LCoW). Under the LCoW, war is conceived in similar terms to the duel; understood as a contract both parties choose to enter into. Its usefulness is characterised through assisting in properly establishing what types of war are to be viewed as illegitimate. By determining the definition of criminal conduct, the LCoW sets up a narrow but firm wall to first sift through which acts of war are not to be tolerated; intersubjectivity therefore is not a prime concern. Under the LCoW, legitimacy flows from the declaration to sue for peace; however, applying reflexivity to the LCoW would reason that wars are not always (or even often) declared anymore. This oxymoron consequently resulted in the forming of the next definition of war.

The State-Centric Conception of War (SCCoW) embodies fighting for a given state’s interests by maintaining that war is a conflict fought by means of organized direct violence between states. The SCCoW does not directly conflict with the main premises of legality versus criminal conduct, but rather consent put forth by the LCoW. Both definitions are distinctly clear as to their viewpoint on the intersubjective meaning behind ‘war,’ and both operate on legitimate relative merits. Accordingly, the declaration of war is dropped as a necessary component of the SCCoW’s perspective of what qualifies as war. The crux of this argument relies on keeping hold of a certain realist Hobbesian perspective towards war yet does not encompass past conflicts in history that occur within the state itself. The following definition of war seeks an even more inclusive methodology, pertaining to the legitimacy of the actors/agents in control of the state. 

The state is not an expression of everything that goes inside it, and War as Organized Direct Violence (WaODV) is the manifestation of this school of thought. Under this definition, conflicts are fought by means of organized direct violence between large, identifiable groups. Emphasis is placed on both the scale of the group and the preservation of the state’s legitimacy. The latter of the two is the core interest that states and large groups alike seek to control via their differing procedures, and the significance of this definition of war is portrayed when the people’s interests are contradictory to that of the head of the state. The weight of this definition expresses two things upon closer examination; it accounts for improper reconciliation between the people and the state’s interests, as well as argue that this concern is legitimate grounds for war-like measures to be enacted.

The first three definitions of war operate from the negative definition of peace, while the last two definitions originate from a different approach. They attempt to define war using what Galtung refers to as structural violence, in relation to Clausewitz’s definition of war. Clausewitz describes war as ‘the continuation of politics by other means.’ In other words, the head of the state’s actions flow from political choices, and in some scenarios, war is the political choice that ensues. In scenarios where war (as previously defined) does not take place, Galtung states that there is still a structural violence causing harm unintentionally. This is referred to as War as Organized Structural Violence (WaOSV), whereby war is characterized as violence that is the unintended consequence of an organized mobilization in pursuit of another objective. In this light, WaOSV is crucial in separating the structure versus agency behind the state’s political choices and defining why restriction of another person’s life chances has occurred. The significance of this definition speaks to the relationship of power between people and groups, which conflict and abuse of power are closely tied to. Therefore, violence can pertain to things outside of the exercising of power, which the last definition of war seeks to expand from.

The concluding definition of war embraces a deep and rather pessimistic viewpoint, defining War as Generalized Structuralized Violence (WaGSV). This definition maintains that violence is caused by structures embedded in the fabric of society itself, since these structures too are products of political choices. This definition is noteworthy because it assists to illustrate the connection between the powerful’s pursuit of interests and the powerless’ lack of it. From the powerless’ perspective, their pursuit of interest only goes so far as the option(s) made available to them, instead of being able to foster their potential capabilities and pursue a route themselves. 

My personal experiences, environment, and upbringing are the biggest factors as to why I would argue that WaODV holds the truest account of war, and is the least problematic. In my perspective, the state’s legitimacy is the selling argument as to why this account (in addition to the previous two) qualifies as war. As the first three definitions of war build from negative peace, clear requirements become formed. This is unlike the latter two definitions, where I would classify the structural violence that occurs not to be legitimate qualifications for defining war, but rather systemic violence incorporating itself among the causes of war debates. While I do not contend that the violence put forth by the latter two definitions are in fact forms of violence, I believe that a further delineation between intended and unintended harm is necessary to propel the debates forward. Moreover, WaGSV seems to grasp the methodology that positive peace must be present in order for peace to occur in a state. How are we to instill a subjective meaning of peace upon everyone in a given state? WaGSV’s core weakness of aspirational solutions lead me to believe that a more defined state of requirements is the first step of many towards defining what war is truly encompassing of. Along the same tangent, WaOSV arises from some sort of programmatic mobilization, which does not always require a losing party. However, I would not argue this to be sufficient as a range of human conduct that counts as war.